

Studies in Theology

Vol. I

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序 文

保守主義 神學 論文集이 나온다는 것은 教界에 기쁜 소식이요, 神學界에 있어서도 값진 業績이 아닐 수 없다. 自由主義 神學 書籍들이 氾濫한 이땅의 教界 出版界에 이 한 권의 論文集은 분명히 이 땅에 保守主義 神學이 살아 있다는 生命의 躍動을 또한번 보여주는 動機가 되는 것이다.

巷間에서는 왜 保守主義 神學者들은 글을 쓰지 못하는가 고 비난 하는듯한 푸념을 터트린다는 소리를 듣는다. 기실 保守主義 神學者들이 글을 못 쓰는 것도 아니고 쓰지 않는 바도 아니다. 다만 陳腐한 이 땅의 出版界가 그들의 글을 容納해 주지 않기 때문에 책으로 出刊되지 못하고 있을 뿐이다.

이 나라 수 많은 出版社는 保守主義 神學者들의 글을 讀者가 적다는 理由로 出版을 해 주지 않는다. 保守主義 神學者들의 글을 읽어 줄 讀者가 적다니 무슨 말인가? 그 理由를 그들은 두 가지로 말 한다.

첫째는 글을 읽는 사람은 自由主義 진영 사람들 뿐이고 保守진영 사람들은 통히 글을 읽지 않는다는 것이다.

둘째는 自由主義 神學者들의 글은 思想에 變遷이 많고 색다른 思想이 계속 展開되기 때문에 時代感覺에 맞아서 讀者들에게 호감을 주지만 保守主義 神學者들의 글은 聖經 中心에서 떠나지 않으려 애쓰므로 새로운 思想도 새로운 思考도 없이 時代에 뒤떨어진 소리들만 하기 때문에 讀者들을 많이 얻지 못 한다고 말을 한다.

우리는 위의 말들에서 생각할 問題가 있다고 기억한다.

첫째, 保守主義 진영 사람들은 왜 글을 읽지 않는가 하는 문제는 심각 하다고 생각하며 우리의 반성할 바라고 본다.

그 時代를 살아갈려면 그 時代를 알아야 한다. 우리가 自由主

義와 新神學을 대항한다고 말은 하면서 그들의 信仰 思想을 몰라가지고야 되겠는가? 그들의 信仰 思想을 바로 알기 위해서는 그들의 글도 많이 읽어야 하겠다. 그리고 保守主義 神學者들의 글이면 더욱 반가운 마음으로 學者들이 글을 쓰는 데 용기를 줄 수 있도록 도우는 의미에서 그들의 책을 많이 사서 소개도 하며 읽어야 할 것이다.

둘째, 保守主義 神學者들의 글은 聖經中心이라니 얼마나 든든한 말인가? 새로운 思想, 새로운 思考가 없어도 좋다. 時代에 뒤떨어졌다 해도 좋다. 聖經 中心이면 全部인 것이다. 事故는 새로운 思想을 찾는 데서 일어난다. 하나님은 人生을 대하실 때 옛날이나 지금이나 同一한 方法으로 대하신다. 原始時代 人生에게 말씀으로 역사하시던 하나님은 石器時代에도 鐵器時代에도 심지어 宇宙時代에 살고 있는 現代人에게도 同一한 말씀으로 역사하신다. 변한 것은 人生이요, 妖邪스러운 것이 人生이지 하나님의 말씀은 不變하신 것이다. 이 不變하신 하나님의 眞理를 변화되어가는 人生들에게 바로 전달하는 것만이 保守主義 神學者들의 使命이기에 그 領域을 벗어 나지 않는 것은 얼마나 귀한 일인가?

이런 저런 여러가지 意味에서 今般 우리 神學校 教授들의 論文集이 나가게 되는 것은 뜻있는 일이다. 이제 남은 問題는 이 책을 많은 讀者들이 사서 읽어주는 일이다 책은 읽히기 위해서 出版이 되는 것이지 出版되는 것으로 만족하기 위하여 出版을 하는 것은 아니다. 이 한 권의 책이 나오기 위하여 많은 사람들이 苦心을 했다. 영영 出刊되지 못할 것 같기도 했었다. 그러나 하나님의 은혜로 出刊하게 되니 감사한 마음 금할 길이 없다. 이 책이 出版되는 것을 契機로 계속 第2卷 第3卷이 나갈 수 있기를 또한 期待해 본다. 끝으로 이 論文集이 나오기 까지 여러 가지로 協調해 주시고 수고해 주신 여래분들께 감사하는 바이다.

高麗神學校

1969年 12月13日

校長 韓 尙 東

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야단 했으며, 오늘날도 合位 哲學의 衝動은 결코 萎縮된 것이 아니다. 그러므로 우리들은 칼발트(Karl Barth) 神學의 영향으로 많은 사람들이 魅惑된 사실을 알 수 있다. 이와 같은 趨勢는 부흐만(Buchman) 運動과 모트링겐(Mottlingen)의 동요들로서 제창되고 있으며, 우리들의 國民生活에 있어서 어떠한 反位의 原理도 거부하는 戰後的 趨勢라고 볼 수 있는데 솔직히 말하면 基督教과 후우머니즘을 소위 人格主義的 社會主義(Personalistic socialism)의 影態로 統合하려는 趨勢인 것이다.

우리들이 모든 合位 哲學을 拒否하고 성경적 哲學과 비성경적 哲學間의 反位의 原理를 強調한 以來 비기독교 思想의 歷史를 研究하는 價値 與否 問題가 일어나게 되었다. 이와 같은 研究는 몇 가지 理由로 有益한 점도 있다. 이 研究는 우리들에게 哲學的 問題로는 解決치 못할 限界를 가르쳐 주며 現時代의 靈의 運動에 關한 正確한 見解를 가르쳐 준다. 더욱 나아가서 이 研究는 非基督教人들의 하나님이 지으신 世界의 많은 多樣性 속에 실제로 存在한다는 特異성과 緊密성을 發見한다는 사실을 우리로 하여금 認識케 한다. 그러나 非基督教人들은 이런 細密한 具體的 眞理를 잘못된 문제와 不正確한 解釋으로 構成된 보다 더 크고 광범한 關聯 속에 거둬서 일변시켜 버리는 致命的 過誤를 면치 못하고 있다. 심지어는 改革派 陣營에서 까지도 概念的 圖式(Conceptual Schema)과 述語(Terms)들이 非基督教 哲學에 起源된 意味 그대로 종종 使用되고 있는데 예를 들면 影相(Form), 質料(matter), 主體(Subject), 客體(object) 같은 것들이다. 이들은 잠재적 위험을 형성하는 동시에 우리 자신들의 陣營에까지 矛盾과 論爭을 일으킨다. 또한 이와 같은 述語들은 우리들을 어두운 골목으로 誘導하고 二律背反과 不要한 混沌 속에 몰아 넣으므로써 改革의 큰 發展을 阻止하고 있다, 그리하여 이들은 哲學에 있어서 그리스도가 받아야 할 榮光을 박탈하고 만다. 結果적으로 우리들은 하나님의 말씀 자체에 基礎한 基督教 哲學을 發展시키므로써 모든 內在 哲學을 물리쳐야 하며 聖經的 眞理와 內在 哲學을 종합한 在來의 基督教 哲學도 改革하여야 한다.

WHAT IS MYTH

by Theodore Hard
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INTRODUCTION

Modern Analyses of Myth

A. The General Sequence of Theories and Methods

The first period of the study of myth, and more generally the study of religion, is the long one from Greek and Roman times through the days of early Christianity, the Middle Ages and the age of exploration and discovery. History, the psychology and the philosophy of religion were not differentiated. The motive of investigation was practical and apologetic in form.

The next period begins at the formation of the history of religion as a science in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. However, the study then was largely of Indo-germanic groups of languages and people then becoming sufficiently known for a grasp of the breadth of detail and for comparison studies. But since these peoples were civilized, or barbarian, not savage, that is, of middle or high levels of culture, generalizations about religious history had insufficient breadth and basis. Nature myths with a religious direction are characteristic of this group of peoples and languages, "And as a matter of fact, the first theory of the history of religion which was constructed

was the theory of nature-myths. According to this, the source of religion and its earliest form was the nature-myth, especially the star-myth; and these myths were generally given a symbolic explanation."¹⁾

Next, scientific attention spread in the first half of the nineteenth century to a study of savage races of Africa, Oceania, and America. Fetish-worship was made the basis of theories by de Brosses in 1760, and was taken up in the mid-1900's by A. Comte and J. Lubbock.

According to Schmidt this cult of fetish-worship belongs to a later stratum of savagery, and so, by inference, the earliest and most primitive stages were not yet under consideration. Similarly, when Herbert Spence (1876 and on) founded his ghost-theory which was long held by philosophers and sociologists, it was based on worship of ancestors, or manism²⁾ which have their roots in two patrilineal forms of culture, totemism and pastoral nomadism.

Next were disclosed the "lower agriculturalists, or matrilineal horticultural peoples among which a belief and worship of souls is manifold." B. B. Ty[or] (1872 and following) built upon his comprehensive theory of animism, "the first theory of the history of religion which was thoroughly worked out and shaped from all sides."³⁾ This theory was the most prominent until the early 1900's.

Meanwhile, decipherment of Babylonian, Assyrian, and

1) Wilhelm Schmidt. *The Origin and Growth of Religion*, trans. by H. J. Rose, 2nd ed. (London; Methuen and Co. 1935) p. 10. Schmidt is followed in this section.

2) Manism is not related to mana but is a term used to describe the worship of the spirits of the dead.

3) Schmidt, *The Origin and Growth of Religion*. p. 11.

Egyptian writing and inscriptions revealed nature-myths and star-myths. So at the end of the nineteenth century a new school of astral and nature-mythologists formed in opposition to the animists.

About the turn of the century there flourished theories that magic was the fore-runner of religion. Schmidt says that this belief in magic was found to prevail among totemistic peoples of the higher hunting tribes. Proponents were J. G. Frazer of England, J. H. King of America (1892). R. R. Marett (after 1895), Hewitt in 1902, K. Th. Preuss in 1904, Vierkandt and Hartland a little later, but especially the French sociological school (led from 1912 on by Durkheim). "In their opinion, totemism and magic combined, in the Central Australian form, are the origin of religion"⁴⁾

In the second decade of the 1900's students of the psychology of religion posited a view that man's earliest stage of religious development was a mixture of undifferentiated religion and magic. Among them Archbishop N. Soderblom in 1916, G. Wobermin in and after 1915, K. Beth in 1914, and Rudolph Otto in and after 1917 looked for an even earlier stage.

Next to be noticed is the school of T. Graebner, Wilhelm Schmidt (*Der Ursprung der Gottesidee*, 1912 and following) and contemporaries such as Paul Radin and Wilhelm Koppers. It has been called the Kulturkreislehre which "postulates a diffusion of successive culture aggregates" which can be traced geographically from the points where constituent traits are found⁵⁾. Also called the school of *Urmonotheismus*, it holds to

4) Schmidt, *The Origin and Growth of Religion*. p. 12.

5) Charles Winich, *Dictionary of Anthropology*. (New York; Philosophical Library, 1956), pp. 305f. At this point a summary of schools is gotten from later sources than Schmidt's useful survey in order to bring things up to date.

the position that high gods are found among very primitive peoples, that monotheism is the primal religion, and that degenerate forms of religion have usually followed. Thus there is a recognition of the findings of the other schools, but a difference in conclusions. According to Jensen, this school attributed "degenerations of mankind's initially rational behavior" to later stages after the beginnings of human history.⁶⁾

In 1951 Jensen said, "At present, three general theories characterize ethno-religious studies. The oldest of them is E. B. Tylor's theory of animism.....It was followed at the turn of the century by the theories of pre-animistic magic.....and *Urmonotheismus*."⁷⁾ He says that they, though old, hold the field except for some changes in the picture in the writings of Mircea Eliade and Werner Muller. (It is apparent, however, that he quite overlooks the variety and strength of recent American views.)

Methodology also influenced the results obtained and Schmidt reminds us of the general sequence.⁸⁾

"The oldest school, that of the nature-mythologists, followed a historical method in the narrower sense of the word. That is, it rested upon the ancient written documents of the various peoples in question.....If these scholars were affected by Evolution at all, it was not the materialistic theory of Darwin, but Hegelian idealism."

The other theories, however, followed the rise of materialism and Darwinism and "their work was all done on the

6) Adolf E. Jensen, *Myth and Cult Among Primitive Peoples*, trans. from *Mythos und Kult bei Naturvolken*, 1951, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 15f.

7) *Ibid*, Introduction, p. 2.

8) *The Origin and Growth of Religion*, p. 13.

lines of Evolutionist natural science. This puts all that is low and simple at the beginning, all that is higher and of worth being regarded only as the product of a.....process of development."⁹⁾

The cultural historical method of Ratzel(1886 and after). Frobenius(1898). Graebner and Ankerman(1905) and Schmidt succeeded the evolutionary, and was a foremost position until recently.

Early in the twentieth century they developed in America what Bidney calls cultural pluralism, a reaction to the monistic view of culture development of the evolutionists. Rivers and, more particularly, Boas, and his students, avoided metaphysical presuppositions and followed the positivistic inductive method, assuming an irreducible plurality of culture types. Comparative evaluation of cultures was not done. This led to avowed cultural relativism, of which Herskovits is an explicit example.¹⁰⁾

A return to the study of cultural universals was made by Malinowski, who saw universal human needs. (He saw no universal absolutes or values, however, except survival value.) So cultural institutions were studied by him in terms of their functions in meeting human needs in various societies. Radcliffe-Brown in England developed a similar functionalism, but with more of a comparative sociological approach.¹¹⁾

In this survey we must look more broadly than to ethno-religious studies, however, and so we go as far afield as

9) *The Origin and Growth of Religion* p. 13.

10) David Bidney, "The Concept of Value in Modern Anthropology", *Anthropology Today*, ed. by A.L. Kreber (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 678-694.

11) David Bidney, "The concept of Value in Modern Anthropology," pp. 694-696.

Cassirer and Freud and Jung, as well as take brief account of analysts of Near Eastern texts. But Perhaps the greatest respect must be given those who have studied myth under field conditions such as the trained anthropologists.

Among the leading views of myth we find, however, not only a bewildering variety of theory, but, more dismaying, a lack of orientation to God-revealed teaching about man. In various details and in structurally a formal way it cannot but be expected that these scholars will say very many true things about myth. In fact it is inevitable that we place heavy dependence on their historical and fist-hand observations as well as their comparative and psychological studies. But, throughout, almost all the scholars dismiss the supernatural element in the Bible as one more example of the mythical. This can be seen in the Sitz im Leben analysis of the mythology of the ancient Near East, where ancient literature is subjected to the norms of modern philosophical and scientific presuppositions.

The purpose of this paper is to take serious account of myth from the Biblical point of view. We believe the most profound analysis to date of myth is that of Herman Doyewerd of the Free University of Amsterdam.

CHAPTER

A Biblically Oriented Analytical Definition of Myth

In the previous historical section definition after definition emerged as successive schools and scholars were surveyed. In the present section it is not the writer's intention to distil from the variety and plethora of speculation about myth some common denominator datum, but to seek for a definition of

myth that will be true both to facts of research and Biblical presuppositions. It is necessary to assert that without the starting point of God-given revelation as to the nature of man and his relationship to his creator, and his fall into a state of apostasy and rebellion, it must remain impossible to rightly understand the motives and actions of man and his reactions to God's revelation, Myth especially reveals the religious conviction, the understanding, and the wishful thinking of man in his confrontation with the transcendent and the eternal. But the Christian knows that the God of the Scriptures is that transcendent One, and the eternal One. To know that He is holy and good, and that man is in his image—to know that man is totally depraved and wanting in holiness, righteousness and true knowledge—and to know that God still impresses His power and godhood upon men so as to leave them holding truth in unrighteousness, without excuse for disbelief, is to put a completely different face upon myth than what we have seen in our historical survey.

The thesis of this paper is that the motivation of mythology as well as all non-Christian philosophy has been, throughout, the motivating power of what Cornelius Van Til has called the "Cain-complex" or the "Anti-God complex."¹² It is the thesis that man's fall in Eden and subsequent recoil from God, and man's insistence on reinterpreting, reigning over, and dedicating all things without reference to the true God, but in reference to self-made deities or deified self, is the source of myth in primitive man. And that applies as well to

12) Cornelius Van Til. *Psychology of Religion* (Philadelphia: Westminster Theological Seminary, 1935. Not a published work, but a classroom syllabus), pp. 116f.

myths extension the speculative theoretical aspect of non-Christian thought called philosophy. Thus, myth is man's substitute for revelation.

Herman Dooyeweerd (1894) a Reformed scholar who builds his philosophy on Biblical pre-suppositions, has profoundly and accurately analyzed myth in its true context, it is the conviction of the writer.¹³⁾ Without anywhere venturing a brief comprehensive definition of myth, it nevertheless does have one sentence in his lengthy analysis that well sums up his salient points He says.

"The 'mythical' is the pistic interpretation of the experience of the deus absconditus' in the apostate root of human existence."¹⁴⁾

The following list includes the chief elements of this "definition" that appear in the subsequent paraphrasing of Dooyeweerd's treatment of the subject of man's fall and his subsequent religious thought, and its mythic aspect.

1. Myth has relation to man's believing function (the pistic)
2. Myth relates to man's interpretation of his experience of God.
3. Myth is an aspect of fallen man's religious thought and experience.
4. Myth is not submissive to, but rather assumes the function of revelation, and thus is a reflection of the experience of the rejected and yet the inescapable revelation of God.

Such a definition is not obtained by an *a posteriori* synt-

13) Herman Dooyeweerd, *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought*. 4 volumes, (Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1955), Vol. 2 in particular.

14) *Ibid.* II, p. 326.

hetic study of the world's treasure of myth. No adequate definition could be so obtained on such a basis alone, for except for an expose of the religious human heart itself, impossible for man, no final and full classification of myths could be possible. Only by reference to God's revelation about Himself and man's spiritual makeup can myth be finally scrutinized for what it is. The irrational in myth, the multiplication of fantastic details, the great variety, all make myth analysis apart from a true religious reference point, a hopelessly relativistic and arbitrary matter.¹⁵⁾ We also saw the variety of analytical starting points in the historical survey ranging from Muller's disease of language to Freud's Oedipus complex—from Rudolf Otto's *mysterium tremendum* to Malinowski's functionalism.

As an advocate of the Calvinist Christian tradition in earnest obedience to the Bible, and as a profound analyst of the history of religious and philosophic thought, Dooyeweerd is worth listening to in his study of myth. The following is an in-sequence paraphrasing of his material covering some 30 pages, but seeking to put it in far simpler terms.

Faith (or the function of believing) is found in all man by virtue of creation (p. 298). Faith is implanted in man's

15) After describing the changing ground-motives of philosophy Dooyeweerd makes a remark equally applicable to mythopoetic thinking:

"It is not surprising, that the apostate main spring can manifest itself in divergent religious motives. For it never directs the attitude of life and thought to the true *totality of meaning* and the true radix of temporal reality, because this is not possible without the concentric direction to the true Origin"

"Idolatrous absolutizing is necessarily directed to the speciality of meaning, which is thereby dissociated from its temporal coherence, and consequently becomes meaningless and void." *Op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 63.

very nature and is not removed by sin. It rather becomes apostate faith, differing from true faith in principle, content, direction, and root, but still is an ineradicable function of man by creation¹⁶⁾ (pp. 298. 302).

The Greek philosophical concept of *pistis* as mere hypothetical opinion. however must be rejected (pp. 303f).

Revelation in 'natur' and revelation by God's Word may be distinguished one from the other, but revelation in nature is disclosed to faith only by God's Word-Word revelation (pp. 306-308).

Apostasy from God began with a refusal to listen to God's Word, and as the function of faith was drawn away from His Word it sought for absolute firm ground in the creation itself. The consequence was the idolatrous absolutizing of meaning in creation.¹⁷⁾ The, natural revelation of God', separated from Word-revelation, now subject faith to the law of God as a

16) Dooyeweerd says, "Faith as a particular modal function is not to be viewed in an exclusively soteriological orientation but in a much wider perspective..... [faith] is an irreducible function in the whole process of human knowledge." *Op. cit.*, II, p. 299. (Here Dooyeweerd builds on Abraham Kuyper.)

17) "If the primitive undisclosed cultural conditions we recognize the subjective *falling-away* on the part of man from his own self and from his Creator....." "Primitive culture..... is characterized exactly by the undisclosed state of the modal cultural aspect in the transcendental direction of time. Here man does not realize that he transcends the things of nature. His sense of being a personality is diffuse, dispersed: he even incorporates personality into animals, plants or lifeless objects.

"The primitive control of nature which develops in such culture is unable to bring home to man that he transcends the things of nature. The whole of the closed cultural aspect, and also logical thought, is here rigidly tied down to its pre-logical substrata. And the fear of the powers of nature which cannot be controlled by ordinary means is at the basis of the content of primitive faith." Dooyeweerd, *Op. cit.*, II, pp. 296.

Two points here must later be qualified (the idea that personality becomes diffuse so far as it is sensed, and the matter of the powers of nature) but the main point is well taken.

course and judgment,¹⁸⁾ in which even God's common grace is unintelligible. Nevertheless, apostate is still functioning as faith (pp. 308f).

By God's common grace¹⁹⁾ a *semen religionis* (cf. Calvin) is preserved in man's heart and moments of truth are retained. This could be so from remnants of the original revelation being still extant, or from contact with the chosen line of faith.

"In many apostate religions important remnants of the original Word-revelation have been retained. It is even possible that through contact with the Jewish race or with Christianity some religions show moments of Biblical origin. But these moments of truth in the apostate faith are baffled because of the radically false direction of the basic motive of the pseudo-religion." (p. 311).

He goes on to speak of "evidence of a conscious repugnant in the human mind to the root and fulness of meaning of the Truth." (p. 311)

At this point we slow down to take fuller account of Dooyeweerd's position as we arrive at the threshold of his discussion of myth. He goes on to say:

"Man, fallen away from truth to this primitive faith,

18) "God's Revelation in the whole of created nature, and primarily in the heart of man, became man's doom when he fell away from the Divine Word-revelation. Where the heart closed itself and turned away from God, the function of *revelation* was closed to the light of God's Word. As a result faith began to manifest its transcendental direction in an apostate way, in the search for an absolute firm ground in creation itself. The inevitable consequence was the idolatrous absolutizing of meaning." *Op. cit.*, II, p. 308.

19) Dooyeweerd attributes the preservation to common grace, but, as Cornelius Van Til has pointed out to the writer, this preservation is due to man inviolately possessing this by way of creation, so that it is not, properly speaking, the sphere of common grace.

even lacks any awareness of his transcendental freedom and of his transcendence above the things in nature. In his function of believing he directs himself to some deification of the natural forces.....He believes that they wield a mysterious power over the natural functions of life in the entire primitive community to which he belongs. To him they are good and destructive deities, who ought to be propitiated or warded off by religious rites. In other words, the restrictive structure of the subjective *pistis* has no other revelational principle than the transcendental certainty about the deity revealing itself in the closed forces of nature, and entitled to religious." (p. 315)

We are struck with the words of Paul in Romans I to the same effect, where he also speaks of the wrath of God for all this. "The invisible things of him [God] since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even his everlasting power and divinityknowing God, they glorified him not as God.....and changed the glory of the incorruptible God for the likeness of an image of corruptible man and of birds, and fourfooted beasts, and creeping things."²⁰⁾

Dooyeweerd goes on to say that "the phantastic [sic] web of mythology woven by primitive man results from his interpretation of the things of nature according to his faith, according to his phantastic sense of the deity."²¹⁾ The divine rev-

20) *American Revised Version* of 1901, Romans 1:20-23.

21) We quoted Dooyeweerd as saying that the mythic was an interpretation of the experience of God while here he adds the interpretation of the things of nature. This is not to imply that in the primitive mind a separation was made consciously. Rather, the very falling away from self and from God causes man to lose logical and cultural developmental powers in part. and to

elation in nature touches the heart of man so that he has a "knowledge", but without Word-revelation he interprets it according to an apostate faith (p. 316)

"Another fruit of this apostasy is "the disintegration of personality awareness, invariably seen in primitive peoples." This is seen in the religious phenomena of mana and totemism. In mana belief a peculiar fluidity or merging of the natural and supernatural, the personal and impersonal is seen. Dooyeweerd believes that mana is sometimes personified in mythical figures, and refers to belief as example of this. Totemism is also seen as erection of another "self" in the identification of the clan with the totem-animal or the totem-plant, and this not on the basis of generation or causality, but on the basis of mutual magical relations, following Cassirer's analysis. All this shows the diffuseness of primitive personality awareness. (pp. 317f)

In the primitive cult there appears also an ethical moment which shows a restrictive structure due to apostate faith. This consists of the worship of good forces of nature and the exercising of the evil, or harmful. Transference of love of God is made to love of the life-force which is not God, but only His gift, and hatred of sin is now transferred to hatred of whatever threatens the life-force as in illness, barrenness,

confuse self, God, and nature as God's revelation, is confused with God. Yet there remains a knowledge of God as separate from nature, says Paul, and man's worship of nature is thus apostasy and idolatrous.

Two elements seem clearly part of Dooyeweerd's view of the myth-making function one, that it is interpretation, two, that it is related to religious faith. To this must be added the factor that there is "conscious repugnance" to the very truth that occasions myth-making as interpretation and religious expression.

and death.

At this point Dooyeweerd introduces a very interesting line of thought in pointing out what he calls "the opening of the function of faith in the apostatical direction," which might be paraphrased as a development or maturing of the function of faith in its direction away from God. He says:

"It is simply impossible to deny that in various religions after a period of primitive and diffuse belief in nature, there is an opening-process of *pistis* in an apostatical direction."

"This opening-process is immediately connected with the emergence of the respective peoples from a more or less primitive stage of civilization."²² (pp. 319f).

Dooyeweerd gives as example the development in Greece, following the thesis of Ernst Cassirer in a general way, but taking issue with Cassirer in the latter's assumption that the individual in a primitive society has no historical or cultural significance. Here he favors Malinowski.

In Greece we see the personal gods of Homer become the

22) In respect to the cultural rigidity and lack of development Dooyeweerd speaks of the binding effect of primitive faith.

"The apostate primitive functions of faith even plays a dominant part in keeping the cultural aspect closed. It binds all the aspects of reality rigidly to their pre-logical substratum-spheres, because it deifies the closed forces of nature. It may be said that primitive culture in its essential traits is guided by this primitive faith in nature, and that this faith draws away all the normative meaning-functions of human consciousness from their super temporal root and Origin. The guidance of faith here means guidance in the falling away of the personality to the pre-logical natural complex. The night of closed 'nature' covers up the primitive cultural communities. For from a deification of closed natural forces no guidance may be expected which could lead the other normative modal functions to an opening and deepening of their meaning." *Op., cit., II, p. 297.*

national gods of the Greeks. In holding to personal gods an emergency of the individual man from his absorption by the group mind of his society takes place. These gods are personal-cultural gods, for they are gods of order and harmony who had, according to Hesiod, "conquered the older deities of indeterminateness (Uranos) and measurelessness (Kronos) and monsters, giants, and "diffuse transitional types" (p. 320). In a correlative way a new movement towards the universal is seen in the personal gods becoming the national gods and more comprehensive social groups than the tribe or group come into being.

Next we see the great height of Greek development in epic poetry, tragedy, and plastic art. The social, Juridical, and moral spheres open themselves and the Greek state and political structure passes through its classical period of ripening. (p. 321).

It is here that we near the climax of this summary sketch. For we enter the field of philosophy as the West knows it, and which is so often mistakenly pictured as the domain of reason as separate from faith. He says,

"In Greek philosophy which continued to be in contact with mythology (witness the influence of Orphism), it is not really philosophical thought as such which gradually undermines polytheistic popular belief. It is rather the transcendental direction of *pistis* to deified theoretical thought, which leads the Greek mind to philosophical self-reflection. Philosophical speculation also remains guided by the function of faith, which in itself is not theoretical." (p. 321f).

In other words, Greek philosophy (and all philosophy) necessarily has presuppositions which are accepted by faith.

The genius of the development of myth to philosophy Dooyeweerd sees as a development of self-consciousness which is at the same time self-absolutization or deification. In the process of making images of his gods he came to see himself. Cassirer makes the same point when he says the mythical gods signify nothing other than successive self-revelations of the mythical consciousness.²³⁾ This tendency develops as man awakens from the bound culture and rigidly closed faith function in primitive thought and religion. In primitive culture man is beneath and subject to diffuse ideas of deity as in the mana belief. But in much later development man is elevated above natural forces.

"In the process of his rising to transcendental self-consciousness, apostate man discovers *his freedom in faith to devise his idol* in the image of the deified normative functions of his own personality. That which is typical for the deepening of *pistis* in the apostate direction, is invariably the search after the human selfhood in the image of cultural idols who give expression to man's elevation above the blind forces of nature." (p. 322)

The rise of mythical self-consciousness Dooyeweerd sees exemplified in, for example, the development in ancient Egypt of moral and juridical functions of personality as seen in making Osiris the judge of good and evil. Similarly, in the Vedic writings the gods Varouna and Mitra, guardians of the world order, are also guardians of the moral and juridical order. Or, more developed, and certainly far from primitive, is the development of the *atman* principle of I-ness of the

23) Ernst Cassirer, *The philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 217.

Indian Upanishads. Dooyeweerd sees all this as development from purification of the biotic natural forces to a concern with the moral and the person. Nevertheless in all this he sees a deepening of apostasy—a deepening “only to be understood as a process in which man arrives at transcendental self-consciousness in his falling away into the absolutization of the relative.” (p. 322).

To bring the discussion to a close and to, in effect, provide us a definition of myth, Dooyeweerd discusses the criterion for distinguishing between mythical and non-mythical thought (pp. 325-328). He well says that from the immanence standpoint to make a distinction between mythical and non-mythical consciousness is well nigh impossible. As to the view of the last century that mythology is pre-religious world and life view—that, too, he rejects. All true myth, he asserts, gives expression to religious motive. It may or may not be connected with a magic view of the world. As to the fictional elements of myth it must still be distinguished from legend and fairy-story as it is an expression of faith of a religious sort.

Myth also must not be connected with the primitive alone. “It may have developed to a high degree of theoretic abstraction in a philosophic theological speculation in which the viewpoint of faith is masked.” (p. 326). He refers to the *atman* conception in the Upanishads, which is far from primitive, and goes on (p. 327) to say that Plato's *me on* and *apeiron* and Hume's psychologistic and Kant's “transcendentalidealistic conception of temporal reality” is also mythological. (p. 327).

To turn full circle and return to our definition, therefore, we quote,

“Mythical faith is characterized by its interpreting the

natural Divine revelation in accordance with the fictitious conceptions of an autonomou's pistical fancy. This is the hybrid character of mythical consciousness by which it is sharply distinguished from the non mythical. It is related to a truth which is necessarily misunderstood." (p. 326).

We note that the pistic interpretation is called "autonomous". Without reference to objective outside authority man apodictically makes statements on his own authority. Herein lies the hubris of fallen man.

Only repentance and acceptance of the Word of God through faith in Jesus Christ brings release from the ever-tightening strangle-hold of myth. Myth is not inevitable, nor the only mode religious thought can take, but it is the form all apostate religious thought eventually takes. Today men such as Niebuhr, Jaspers, Tillich and others sense deeply that modern religious thought, for all its care to be philosophically that modern religious thought, for all its care to be philosophically self-consistent, still remains essentially myth. Unfortunately these men see in myth not a denial of truth, but the only possible mode of expression of ultimate reality, or the transcendent, or the "depth of reason". They deny the fact and possibility of objective contentful revelation from God deposited in human history and consider myth to be inevitable. It is not inevitable, and the Gospel of Jesus Christ in not myth, but rather the only escape from myth.

CHAPTER I

ESSENTIAL PARTS OF DOOYEWEERD'S ANALYSIS AND AGREEMENT WITH STUDENTS OF MYTH

To find a concurrence of opinion among students of myth would be of interest and value, but areas of universal agreement are small. A concurrence of opinion among actual myth analysts who did field work and direct observation would be even more desirable. However, anthropologists have spent less time on psychic and less material aspects of primitive culture than they have on material and measurable aspects. Not only so, but the tendency, probably wise has been to do direct observation and recording without generalizations. It is a new science. The very nature of myth, its great variety, its subtlety, its vagaries, its relation to religion, to speculation, to psychology and its emotional involvements, all makes analysis and generalization more difficult. It is easy to see why students of religion, or psychology, and society also should try to take account of myth. And because of the special skills of these separate disciplines we should be able to expect fruitful insights. Again, however, a summary of concurring opinion produces too small an area of agreement, and in any case, whom shall we include and exclude from our summary?

Therefore this section will only in a general way try to indicate where Dooyeweerd finds substantial support in his assertions. The writer agrees with his main position, and here wishes to show that it in the main is assisted actually or formally (since often from different presuppositions) by

students of myth. The result may seem like a patchwork quilt of the thought of various students, yet it is not a composite of their views, but a general consensus of opinion standing with the Biblically structured view of Dooyeweerd. We use the looser dictionary definition of consensus which says it can mean "loosely, in more recent usage, the unified or convergent trend, as of opinion." (Webster's New International Dictionary. 2nd edition). The net total is the position of the writer.

I. Epistemological and Philosophical Aspects of Deeyeweerd's View of Myth.

(1) Perhaps all myth scholars will agree with Dooyeweerd that there is fantastic detail and great variety in myths. He attributes it to lack of direction to the true source of meaning, and the absolutization of the relative in the variety of creaturely things. This basic reason for variety is lacking in the analysis of the world leaders in myth study. The range of human fancy (Cassirer, Howells), the conditioning by natural environment (Schmidt); the various needs of validation of screen from reality (Malinowski); the varying memory of an ancient past (Freud); spontaneous variety as is also seen in the similar phenomenon of the unconscious-dreams (Freud, Jung); and even the revision of myths by separate chanters as noted by Kluckhohn¹⁾ can be put forward as accounting for the complex and numberless differences seen in myth content. No doubt there are all partial reasons why great variation can be expected in myths. But the basic reason given by Dooyeweerd is the only one that penetrates to the core of the problem.

1) Clyde Kluckhohn, "Myths and Rituals: A General Theory", The Harvard Theological Review, XXXV (1942), pp. 61ff.

(2) Myth, as already inferred, has fictitious elements, but is the object of belief, so is to be distinguished from what are widely called fairy story and legend. Various scholars of myth make this distinction, and according to Malinowski similar distinctions are made in their own folklore by the Trobriand Islanders in their primitive estate. All three are fictitious in content, but myth is seriously believed and has religious overtones. Legend has historical background with fictitious additions and has less religious orientation. Fairy story or marchen are fictitious but told solely for entertainment.

If believed, it would seem apparent that myth's fictitious element is not consciously invented by the believer. But the power of wishful thinking is very great, and man's ability for self-deception, and for creating the objects of his own faith is nothing new. Dooyeweerd's whole analysis of Western philosophy shows the continuing tendency. Without Word revelation man had no source of understanding, so he autonomously used what Dooyeweerd calls the "pistical fancy." This explanation of this fictitious but believed element in myth is nowhere so critically explained as in Dooyeweerd.

(3) In spite of the fictitious and fanciful elements permeating myth, certain recurring themes, certain similarities, even a certain principle of unity in mythology is seen by many. Tylor saw a regularity in the imaginative processes, and "universal qualities" of the human mind as well as a "regularity of development" of legend (myth). Howell says,

"There are certain typical forms in religion, certain particular notions, which the mind seems to find especially interesting and important; high points in the mental landscape to which the attention turns again and again,

or perhaps channels into which the imagination easily slips and runs. Everywhere people believe in souls, for example, and in magic, and generally in certain other things like witches. These ideas, probably old and seemingly as natural and universal as speech itself, cannot be meaningless and haphazard."²⁾

Linton lists three nearly universal beliefs—the existence of supernatural beings “conceived of as essentially human in motives and emotions,” the possibility of obtaining aid from such beings in man’s inadequacy, and a belief in persistence after death.³⁾

In the psycho-analytical school there is conviction that universal symbolism (Jung’s archetypes) and central motivational themes (Freud’s Oedipus complex and collective consciousness) are perceptible, and these suggestions are influencing anthropologists and students of myth who have become convinced in their own fields that they are helpful and generally valid (Kluckhohn, Hallowell, Frankfort).

In the area of comparative mythology in Near Eastern studies Gaster speaks of a “common stock of natural images” among Semitic and indo-Europeans, and similar ritual and mythopoeic reactions among men everywhere to the rhythms of nature and the succession of seasons.⁴⁾

It would appear, then, that we can expect certain similarities, some certain basic uniformity in myth, varied though

2) Howells, *The Heathen*, pp. 7f. (other data unavailable).

3) Ralph Linton, “The Problem of Universal Values” in Robert F. Spencer, ed., *Method and Perspective in Anthropology* (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press 1954).

4) Theodor Gaster, *Thespis* (New York: Henry Schuman, 1950), p. 13.

elements of myth may be. Though this may not be so as to narrative content, The underlying motives and themes may be the same. Man is one, though found in various stages of cultural progression. Certain psychological facts are universal the helplessness and need of protection of the infant, the competition with brothers and sisters for parental affection, the natural phenomena of weather and astronomical lights. Man is one race, also. It is significant that anthropologists more and more acknowledge that primitive and civilized man have no fundamental difference in ways of thinking (Boas⁵⁾, Radin⁶⁾). More and more disagree with Levy-Bruhl in his theory of primitive prelogical thinking, and he himself repudiated his theory shortly before his death. Evidence also seems to be mounting to the effect that the stone drawings of the paleolithic cave dwellers of prehistoric Europe and their burial practices reveal similarities with modern primitives.⁷⁾

(4) Myth is interpretation of the experience of God. There is a certain formal similarity between Otto and Dooyeweerd in that both see myth as a creation of man in response to the impingement of the transcendent upon man’s consciousness. But it is only formal, for the God that Dooyeweerd refers to is far different from the projection that Otto speaks of. To Otto doctrines about God are rationalizations of pure experience which rationalization takes place in an evolution of thinking

5) Franz Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man* (New York: Collier Books, 1963), p. 17.

6) Paul Radin, *Primitive Man as Philosopher* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1927), throughout.

7) G. Rachel Levy, *Religious Conceptions of the Stone Age and Their Influence Upon European Thought* (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963) pp. 3-28.

stimulated by the numinous emotion. This is very similar to Schleiermacher who held that attributes ascribed to God point not to things special in God but to things special in the manner in which the feeling of absolute dependence in to be related to God.

The students of myth are agreed that myth is concerned with ideas of deity. But they do not themselves testify to the one true God of the Scriptures. So attempt is made to describe myth as interpretation of supposed experience in contact with supposed deities or supernatural forces. The evolutionists make myth dependent on a lower level of religion as belief in mana, or totemism. Ideas of personal anthropomorphic deity were considered later developments of thought. Even Lang and Schmidt, who find a belief in a Supreme Being in very primitive peoples, say that this is the product of rationalization or causalistic thinking by early people.

Schmidt, a Roman Catholic, does admit that vestiges of the original revelation of God were remembered.⁸⁾ Nevertheless he makes the belief in a Supreme Being a product not of true contact with the true God, but a product or speculation by the primitive. Roman Catholic natural theology concerning this point no doubt controls Schmidt's thinking. Berkouwer explains that though the revelation of God in nature is acknowledged by Rome it is mere acknowledgment, and the emphasis is always on the sufficiency of man's reason. Thus we cannot identify general revelation and natural theology.⁹⁾

Berkouwer says,

8) Wilhelm Schmidt, *Primitive Revelation* (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Company, 1939), p. 40f.

9) G. C. Berkouwer, *General Revelation* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1966), p. 61.

"In summary, we can say that Roman Catholic theology involves the relation between man's rational nature and 'reality'. The road to a knowledge of God is by way of logical conclusion. This brings us, finally, to the question whether Rome really acknowledges a revelation of God in this created reality. This question is answered affirmatively. Nevertheless, one is always amazed how little place this revelation idea gets in the exposition of natural theology. Human reason is always placed over against the 'fact' of nature. God is not in some way found in nature. Rather, from the fact of nature, no matter how it appears and apart from the question whether it is revelation, reason concludes that nature has a cause, a 'first cause'. The function of human reason is not to investigate revelation but to draw logical conclusions."¹⁰⁾

The Catholic denial of the depravement of reason in the fall of man, and the idea of the *donum superadditum* as a pressure cap to contain inherent lasciviousness in man before the fall, leaving man after the fall in his natural estate, only divested of the pressure cap, controls this doctrine as well.

We must conclude, then, that Schmidt, though a Christian, in effect has really sided with the immanentistic philosophers like Otto and Schleiermacher who deny a historical fall and posit the sufficiency of human reason. On Schmidt's basis, supernatural truths of revelation are only needed by way of supplementation.

So Dooyeweerd's assertion that the 'mythical' is the interpretation of the experience of God is unique among the students of myth covered in this paper. And it provides a link between

10) *Ibid.*, pp. 74-75.

the understanding of the Biblical teaching of the *sensus deitatis* and the teaching of progressive idolatry and deification of nature in Romans chapter one. Schmidt, a Roman Catholic priest, does not make room for Dooyeweerd's thesis. To him the corruption of mythical thinking from early high views of deity is a corruption of a rational construction of thought, not a corruption of what God has revealed himself as, or an apostasy away from what fallen man could still know of God. But discussion of the falling away from belief in God will come later in this paper.

(5) Dooyeweerd also says that myth is interpretation of the things of nature. This interpretation is by apostate man "according to his faith, according to his phantastic sense of the deity." Tylor agrees that myth is concerned with nature, and is even aetiological. Lang also thought so. Frankfort sees speculation on a large scale in the mythology of the ancient Near East. Eliade says, "Primitive peoples have revealed to the investigator systems of anthropo-cosmic homologies of extraordinary complexity, which bear witness to an inexhaustible capacity for speculation."¹¹ The work of Hooke, Frankfort, and Gaster would seem to indicate that in ancient Near East mythology the gods and nature are not separated in the myth-believer's mind. The "topocosm" idea of Gaster helps very much to see that myth, as Dooyeweerd also says, is interretation of the experience of deity and at the same time, not separated in the minds of the myth believer, an interpretation of nature. Nature is so interpenetrated with the supernatural as to be one mytterious electric unity. As many seem

11) Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and Profane* (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p. 169

to agree, the more primitive belief in *mana* illustrates this confusion in thinking.

But to say that myth is interpretation is not quite to say it is explanation, or consciously seeks to account for natural phenomena. Very few scholars would say that myth is the science of the primitive. Malinowski, for example, is against the aetiological view of myth. But the dispute over this seems to be whether or not there is conscious intellectualizing by the primitive. Perhaps Radin says it best when he observes,

"It may be correct to say that while, strictly speaking, primitive man does not think of a cause-and-effect sequence, he does predicate causes as such and effects as such; that the medicine-man and thinker deal with causes as such and sometimes with a real cause-and-effect relation, whereas the average man deals with effects simply."¹²

It has also been pointed out just as man vary today between the reflective individual and the non-reflective, so we must expect the same distinction among the primitives. And it appears that myth, though hardly ever seen in the making, must be the product more of the philosopher type than the average man.

The relationship of myth to ritual observed by many scholars may illustrate the special way that myth interprets nature, It would appear that ritual is often performed to bring about or guarantee the continuation of life-protecting processes of the god-filled nature, and myth constitutes the in time order of ritual in terms of ideal, timeless situation involving deities. In this sense myth may be said to "interpret" nature, and it

12)op. cit., p. 30

is, as Dooyeweerd said, an interpretation according to the fantastic sense of deity.

(6) Dooyeweerd appears to say that myth development is culturally conditioned (opening 9 pages above). He mentions that "The peculiar aesthetic humanizing of Greek polytheism since Homer and Hesiod is doubtless based on a civilization that had been opened to a rather considerable degree."¹³ Dooyeweerd is probably mistaken when he says that Homer and Hesiod created the mythical forms of Greek popular faith,¹⁴ but his statement that the concept of deity portrayed in myth was subject to change by the developing cultural concepts is no doubt correct. He points out that Hesiod in his *Theogony* speaks of the conquering of the older gods "of indeterminateness and measurelessness" by the younger deities in which personal self-determination is clearly marked and intercourse between one another and men is described. Simultaneously there was a development in Greek culture toward individualization.

Similarly, in Egypt there is a mythical development caused by, or at least associated with "a gradual rise of mythical self-consciousness to the normative juridical and moral functions of the personality." The development of the concept of the god Osiris is seen in that earlier he as god of the dead had to be compelled by magic to receive the dead favorably. But later he emerges as the judge of good and evil,¹⁵ a parallel moral and juridical development to the development of juridical and moral functions of the human personality.

13) Dooyeweerd, op. cit., II, p. 320.

14) Ibid., p. 321.

15) Dooyeweerd, op. cit., II, p. 324.

This view of the parallel development of myth and culture is supported by Schmidt, Boas, Malinowski, Hallowell, Eliade and Kluckhohn. Schmidt, as we saw, observed that the concept of the high god varied in separate culture developments. For example, in the matrilineal agrarian culture the deity was often considered female. In the patriarchal cattle-breeding cultures where nomadic peoples lived under the limitless sky of the deserts and steppes, the deity was a sky-god, or even the sky itself.

Kluckhohn, comparing the Navahos and Pueblos, saw the same principle in action. The Navahos complain much of sickness, though no more real sickness comes to them than to other tribes. Their myths and rituals reflect this concern in that they are focused on health and the curing of disease. The Pueblos, however, though more often sick than the Navahos, complain less. Their rituals are predominately concerning rain and fertility (they, live in a dry region). The Navahos again show concern in reference to human relationships and their myths reveal that they expect cure not only of diseases, but also of anti-social tendencies.¹⁶

This phenomenon we relate to epistemology for it shows that myth is a mental reflection of cultural concerns and concepts as well as hopes of the myth believer. It also suggests the reflexive reproductive power of thought in that thinking in one modal area affects another area, and thought about this world bounces back and reemerges from the mind with new conceptualization of the transcendental and transcendent.

(7) Time in mythic thought is quite different from the

16) "Myths and Rituals: A General Theory," pp. 73, 75.

view of time of modern man, according to Cassirer, Frankfurt and Cassirer's point is that in myth past, present, and future are undifferentiated.¹⁷⁾ There is, to be sure, a sequence of events in the myth narrative, but to the myth believer it is all eternal event. The past has never passed away. He speaks of "biological time" in this context-time experience in the periodic sequence and rhythm of personal life (childhood, adolescence, adulthood, senility). And these transitions are marked by crises in which public ritual by the community gives assistance. Time is thus richly experienced. Henri Frankfurt takes essentially the same view. "Mytho-poetic thought does not know time as a uniform duration or as a succession of qualitatively indifferent moments. Early man does not abstract a concept of time from the experience of time."¹⁸⁾ Gaster says that myth construes the punctual parts of ritual in terms of the derivative of timeless. Life here is also apparently thought of as participation in a kind of infinite continuum of a transcendent world.¹⁹⁾ This strongly reminds us of the modern concept of *Geschichte*, which is also mythical, it must be realized.

(8) The mythical view of space, like time, is not an abstract concept, and locations are not unambiguously fixed.

The spatial concepts of the primitive are concrete orientations; they refer to localities which have an emotional color; they may be familiar or alien, hostile or friendly. Beyond the scope of mere individual experience

17) Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), p. 173.

18) Henri Frankfurt, *Frankfurt, H. A., et al.*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 23.

19) Thespis, p. 24.

the community is aware of certain comic events which invest regions with a particular significance. Day and night give to east and west a correlation with life and death. Speculative thought may easily develop in connection with such regions as are outside direct experiences, for instance, the heavens or the nether world. Mesopotamian astrology evolved a very extensive system of correlations between heavenly bodies and events in the sky and earthly localities. Thus mythopoetic thought may succeed no less than modern thought in establishing a co-ordinated spatial system; but the system is determined, not by objective measurements, but by an emotional recognition of values."²⁰⁾

The unimportance of precise location is seen in that in Egypt each Holy of Holies throughout the land was identified as the primeval hill which was the first emergence of land from the primeval waters of chaos and the place where the emerging creator stood. So it was claimed in the very name of the great shrines at Memphis, and Hermonthis.²¹⁾

(9) Apparently very close to the confusion in relation to time and space is the identification of the real and the possible, the fact and the ideal. Cassirer Frankfurt²²⁾ (who asserts that there is confusion of subject and object, living and dead, reality and appearance, act and symbol). and Gaster all roughly concur. Gaster, says, "The function of myth is to translate the real into terms of the ideal, the punctual into

20) *The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man*, p. 21.

21) *Ibid.*

22) *op. cit.*, pp. 11-26.

23) Thespis, p. 24.

terms of the durative and transcendental. This it does by projecting the procedures of ritual to the plane of ideal situations, which they are then taken to objectify and reproduce."²³

Similarly, Langer says of the identification of symbol and object,

"Until symbolic forms are consciously abstracted they are regularly confused with the things they symbolize. This is the same principle endowed with power, and sacraments to be taken for efficacious acts; the principle set forth by Cassirer..... 'It is typical of the first naive, unreflective manifestations of linguistic thinking as well as the mythical consciousness that its content is not sharply divided into symbol and object, but both tend to unite in a perfectly undifferentiated fusion.' This principle marks the line between the 'mythical consciousness' and the 'scientific consciousness,' or between implicit and explicit conception of reality."²⁴

It is, of course, easy to overstate the case in order to have a neat contrast. Some modern, apparently scientific people also consider certain sacraments efficacious. And the ancient cave dweller who drew pictures of animals pierced with spears to symbolize victory in the hunt did not mistake the animal and the drawings. He knew he could eat one but not the other. But, in a general way these analyses strongly support Dooyeweerd's estimate of myth, though he does not make the precise point. The fallen man has lost his grip on truth, his understanding falters at every point, the very potentiality for thought and cultural development is thus

24) Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key* (New York: Mentor Books, 1959), pp. 207f

shackled. False faith totally immanentizes deity and makes self transcendent. Man misunderstands the meaning of reality and so even the simplest concepts of number and extension are transmuted and reshaped to suit the mythic fancy. Wishful thinking becomes religious and principle truth. Intellectual suicide nears completion.

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